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ABSTRACT
Oil and Macroeconomy
by
Islam Rizvanoghlu
Traditional literature on energy economics gives a central role to exogenous polit-
ical events (supply shocks) or to global economic growth (aggregate demand shock)
in modeling the oil market. However, more recent literature claims that the increased
precautionary demand for oil triggered by increased uncertainty about a future oil
supply shortfall is also driving the price of oil. The intuition for the precautionary
demand motive is that since firms, using oil as an input in their production process,
are concerned about the future oil prices, it is reasonable to think that in the case
of uncertainty about future oil supply (such as a highly expected war in the Middle
East), they will buy futures and/or forward contracts to guarantee a future price and
quantity. We find that under baseline Taylor-type interest rate rule, real oil prices,
inflation and output loss overshoot and go down below their steady state values at
the next period if uncertainties are not realized. However, if the shock is realized, i.e.
followed by an actual supply shock, the eﬀect on inflation and output loss is high and
persistent.
Second chapter analyzes the implications of storage market for the monetary pol-
icy formulation as a response to an oil price shock. Recent literature suggests that
although high oil prices contributed to recessions, they never had a pivotal role in
the creation of those economic downturns. A general consensus is that the decline
in output and employment was due to the rise in interest rates, resulting from the
Fed’s endogenous response to higher inflation induced by oil price shocks. However,
traditional literature assumes that oil price shocks are exogenous to the U.S econ-
omy and ignores the storage market for crude oil. In this regard, a model with an
endogenous (demand shock) or exogenous (supply shock) price shock may produce a
totally diﬀerent monetary policy proposal when a market for crude oil storage exists.
The rationale behind this idea is that when goods prices are sticky in the economy,
the monetary authority can aﬀect the level of inventories through changes in real
interest rates. Thus, lower interest rate rules, as proposed in the literature, will cause
additional oil supply scarcity in the spot market. Therefore, an optimal monetary
policy that maximizes the welfare in the economy should consider the adverse aﬀect
of low interest rates on the crude oil market.
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1Chapter 1
Oil Price Shocks and Macroeconomy: The Role of
Storage and Precautionary Demand
1.1 Introduction
The energy crisis of 1973-1974 coincided with one of the longest post-World War
recessions. This gave rise to many studies on the eﬀects of oil price increases on the
economy. A large number of studies tried to establish theoretical links and document
empirical evidence in support of the idea that oil prices were responsible for the
recession, episodes of inflation, reduced productivity and declining economic growth.
In fact, Figure 1.1 shows that 9 of the 10 recessions in the United States were preceded
by a sharp rise in the price of oil.
However, closer examination of this fact reveals that the economy does not respond
in the same way to oil price movements. To be precise, since the late 1990s, the global
economy has experienced two oil shocks of sign and magnitude comparable to those
of the 1970s, but, in contrast with the previous episodes, GDP growth and inflation
have remained relatively stable in much of the industrialized world. In order to
explain this diﬀerence, energy economics literature primarily takes two approaches.
The first approach claims that the oil price shocks themselves were never important
2Figure 1.1 : Real oil prices and US recessions
factors behind those macroeconomic downfalls, their eﬀects were rather exaggerated.
In other words, according to some researchers (Bernanke et al. (1997), Wei (2003),
Dhawan and Jeske (2006)) oil prices themselves are not the creators, but just the
marginal contributors to those recessions. A second approach focuses on the nature
of these shocks and challenges the notion that the major oil movements, at least, can
be viewed as exogenous with respect to the U.S. economy (Barsky and Kilian (2001),
Blanchard and Gali (2007a)).
This paper tries to explain the nature of oil price shocks and their eﬀects on
macroeconomic variables. Traditional literature on energy economics gives a central
role to exogenous political events in modeling the oil prices. However, more recent
studies (Barsky and Kilian (2001), Kilian (2009), Blanchard and Gali (2007a)) take
a diﬀerent stand and provide arguments in favor of reverse causality from macroeco-
3nomic variables to oil prices. Additionally, these papers draw attention to diﬀerences
between oil prices shocks and their macroeconomic implications in the 1970s and
2000s. The main conclusion of these papers was that oil price shocks were caused by
supply disruptions in the 70s and aggregate demand shocks in 2000-2008.
Kilian (2009), on the other hand, constructs a structural VAR model of the global
crude oil market and concludes that oil price shocks have been driven mainly by a
combination of global aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks,
rather than simple oil disruptions caused by exogenous events in the Middle East.
Kilian claims that while exogenous political events do aﬀect oil prices, especially in the
1990s, it is less about the physical supply disruptions and more about the increased
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfall which is driving the price of oil.
Figure 1.2 : World oil consumption (yearly average)
According to the energy economics literature (Kim and Loungani (1992), Hamilton
4and Herrera (2004)), oil price movements in 1973 and 1991 were caused by oil supply
disruptions during exogenous events in the Middle East (OPEC embargo and Iraq-
Kuwait war, respectively). However, as it is shown in Figure 1.2, yearly average world
oil consumption was increasing in the aftermath of 1991, while decreasing during the
1973-75 OPEC embargo, which means that the supply cut argument is not valid for
the 1991 oil price shock. Therefore, Kilian (2009) claims that the latter is caused
by the precautionary demand motive of the firms using oil as an input for their
production. This motive is usually triggered by a concern about a future oil supply
disruption (for example, a highly expected war in the Middle East).
Based on this motivation, we built a theoretical model to quantify and examine
the nature of oil price shocks caused by precautionary demand in the crude oil market.
We constructed a standard DSGE model with the sticky-prices where firms can have
access to an oil futures market. In this model, there is also the storage operators, who
buy the oil in the spot market and hedge it by selling the oil futures in the futures
market. Using this model, we simulated the eﬀects of these demand shocks on the
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and inflation.
It is intuitive to think that in the case of an increased uncertainty about future
oil supply, the firms using oil as an input will buy futures and/or forwards contracts
to guarantee a future price and quantity. Moreover, higher demand in the futures
market would encourage the storage operators to increase their inventories and, thus,
create scarcity in the spot market for oil. That, in turn, will induce the spot price
5of oil to increase immediately. This modification was first introduced by Alquist and
Kilian (2010) to derive the immediate eﬀect of an uncertainty about the future oil
supply shortfalls on the real spot price of oil. They model the oil supply of a foreign
country as a stochastic mean-preserving process. When there is “news” today about
the future availability of the oil, the variance of the oil endowment for tomorrow
goes up permanently and creates an uncertainty shock. This setup allows us to
separate the mean eﬀect (supply shock) from the variance eﬀect (uncertainty shock).
Unlike Alquist and Kilian (2010), model also allows for temporary increases in the
uncertainty. Similarly, news about the future availability of the oil supply creates an
uncertainty in the market. However, if the concern of the agents are not realized (i.e.
no supply shortfall), they will reasonably update their beliefs and become less and
less concerned over time.
As another improvement on Alquist and Kilian (2010), we employ this extension
in a standard cashless DSGE model with the sticky-prices (Woodford (2003)) to
analyze the dynamics of macroeconomic variables when agitated by a future oil supply
uncertainty. Since oil is used as an input in the production process, any surge in its
price, caused by a future oil supply uncertainty or a current supply shortfall, will
increase the production cost and lead to a ”supply side” disturbance in the economy.
Recently, we became aware of related work by Unalmis et al. (2012). They have
independently studied the role of storage as a source of oil price shock and examined its
macroeconomic eﬀects. Their model is very similar to ours, however, they introduce
6speculative demand shock that ignores precautionary demand motives aﬀected by
second-order through the volatility in oil supply. Moreover, unlike Unalmis et al.
(2012), our model allows for studying monetary policy implications of oil prices shocks
in the presence of storage.
These findings also have important policy implications for thinking about the
eﬀects of oil price changes on the U.S. economy. Some recent literature suggests
that although high oil prices contributed to recessions, they have never had a pivotal
role in the creation of those economic downturns (Bernanke et al. (1997), Leduc and
Sill (2004)). In this regard, tight monetary policy is often blamed for exaggerating
the adverse eﬀects of oil price shocks. As diﬀerent oil price shocks cause diﬀerent
dynamics in income and inflation variation, one has to consider the nature of the
shock before formulating a policy to cope with those adverse eﬀects.
We find that under baseline Taylor-type interest rate rule, real oil price, inflation
and output loss overshoot in the first period, but goes down below steady state at
the next period if uncertainties are not realized. However, if the shock is realized,
i.e. followed by an actual supply shock, the eﬀect on inflation and output loss is
high and persistent. In this case, the existence of storage increases the variability of
macroeconomic variables and the real price of oil by transmitting future worries into
todays decision making process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3
presents the model, Section 4 describes competitive equilibrium, market clearing con-
7ditions and aggregation. Section 5 discuss calibration and simulation results. Lastly,
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 The Magnitude of the Oil Price Eﬀect
Hamilton and Herrera (2004) and Hamilton (2005) point out that nine out of ten of
the U.S. recessions since World War II and every recession since 1973 were preceded
by a spike in oil prices. However, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and the Energy Information Administration, between 1970 and 2005, residential and
commercial and industrial energy consumption was on average 4.8% and 4% of GDP,
respectively. Based on this fact, change in oil prices can only explain a small fraction
of the drop in GDP during a recession.
To solve this puzzle, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) studied output impulse re-
sponse functions and showed that under imperfect competition conditions the eﬀect
of oil price shock is stronger than the one observed under perfect competition con-
ditions. They estimated that a 1 percent increase in energy prices lead declines in
U.S. output of 0.25 percent and in U.S. real wages of 0.09 percent about five to six
quarters later. Moreover, Finn (2000) shows that one can increase the response of
an oil price shock even under perfect competition conditions if energy use is modeled
as a function of capacity utilization. Finn argues that an increase in the price of
energy works as an adverse technology shock to induce a contraction in the economic
8activity and the magnitude of the force exerted by energy price shock derives from
the relationship between energy usage and capital services.
However, both papers are silent on the business cycle properties of the model
in response to energy shocks. Precisely, they do not report the share of output
fluctuations explained by energy price shocks and the other business cycle facts such
as volatility of investment, consumption and co-movement of these variables. In fact,
by incorporating energy use exclusively on the production side in DSGE models, Kim
and Loungani (1992) claims that energy price fluctuations can only generate a small
fraction of the output fluctuations observed in U.S. data. They even conclude that
all previous recessions would have occurred even without energy shocks, since output
is mainly driven by shocks to the total factor productivity.
To solve the controversy of low share in total expenditure and high share in out-
put fluctuations, some studies claim that a jump in energy prices make a substantial
fraction of the capital stock obsolete. Baily (1981) argues that as a result of high
energy prices expected profits of machines in operation declines. The value of exist-
ing capital decreases as it is not technologically suited to new economic conditions.
Besides, firms will not be willing to invest in new machinery, unless the high price
lasts for a lengthy period. Therefore, this mechanism will lead to low levels of stock
market prices. Although this link was realized in the literature, only Wei (2003)
analyzes the causal link between energy price shock and stock marker crush in a
partial-equilibrium setup. In a partial-equilibrium putty-clay model, where the real
9wage and interest rates are fixed exogenously, Wei finds that an 80-percent permanent
increase in the real energy price leads to a 10-percent decline in the market value of
previously installed machines. This impact is even smaller (only a 2-percent decline)
in a general-equilibrium putty-clay model, which is an extreme case of rigidity in the
adjustment of capital ex post. According to Wei (2003), the energy price increase
causes real wages to decline by around 3.8 percent. The decline in real wages is large
enough to oﬀset most of the increase in cost coming from the capital side.
Lastly, some authors argue that stagflation of the 1970s was largely due to factors
other than oil. Barsky and Kilian (2001) claim that stagflation may have been partly
caused by exogenous changes in monetary policy, which coincided in time with the
rise in oil prices. Bernanke et al. (1997) argue that much of the decline in output and
employment was due to the rise in interest rates, resulting from the Feds endogenous
response to the higher inflation induced by oil shocks.
1.2.2 What has changed lately?
Blanchard and Gali (2007b) define an oil shock as an episode where the overall increase
in oil price has been higher than 50% and has lasted for more than one year. Following
this criteria four oil shocks are identified for the period 1970 to 2005. Despite the fact
that these oil shocks are similar in magnitude, they have been associated with very
diﬀerent macroeconomic performances. While the first two episodes (1973:2-1974:1
and 1978:4-1980:2) of oil price increase coincided with an increase in all inflation
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variables and a decrease in GDP growth and real wage, the last two episodes (1998:4-
2000:4 and 2001:4-2005:3) coincide with a positive GDP growth rate, an increasing
real wage and low inflation. In the light of these evidences, Blanchard and Gali (2007)
try to explain the diﬀerence between various oil shocks assuming that the source of
the change in oil price is always the same, i.e. an exogenous increase in oil price.
They consider diﬀerences in monetary policy, in the degree of wage rigidity and the
proportion of oil used in the production and show that a change in each of them can
reduce the volatility of both price and quantity in response to the same oil shock.
However, Kilian (2009) and Balke et al. (2010) challenge the idea that oil price
shocks were alike, i.e. exogenous. They underline the importance of identifying
supply vs. demand shocks to oil prices. Balke et al. (2010) formulate that the oil
price shocks of the 2000s occurred as a consequence of persistent increase in foreign
productivity, while in the 1970s there was, simply, a reduction in oil supply. It is
intuitive to expect diﬀerent sources of oil price increase to convey diﬀerent dynamics.
Namely, an exogenous reduction in the supply of oil followed by high oil prices will
boost marginal costs and there- fore deliver an increase in inflation. This scenario is
consistent with the observed data of the 1970s, but cannot be applied to the 2000s.
An exogenous and persistent increase in productivity of a foreign country (such
as China) in a simple two-country model leads to an increase in foreign GDP. Given
the increased production, a persistent shock will induce a higher oil demand and
therefore drive the oil price up. The home economy will still experience higher oil
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prices because of reduction in oil supply. However, there will be a reduction in the
price of imported goods, as the foreign country is more productive now. As a result,
CPI inflation in the home country may actually decrease, which in turn, generates an
increase in real wages.
Lastly, the richer foreign country will buy more home goods, and therefore output
in the home country will also increase. Apparently, this story tells us that the dy-
namics of oil price, inflation, real wages and GDP observed in the 2000s is consistent
with an increase in oil demand driven by an increase in productivity in countries like
China and India.
On the other hand, Kilian (2009) takes this analysis further and claims that there
is even a third type of oil price shock. He provides a decomposition of real oil price into
oil supply shock, shocks to the aggregate global demand for industrial commodities
and demand shocks that are specific to the oil market (i.e. precautionary oil demand).
Using this decomposition, he claims that, while the oil price increases in the 1970s
were mainly due to precautionary demand increase, in the 2000s oil price shocks were
caused by aggregate demand shocks.
1.3 The Model
This study extends the standard cashless Dynamic New Keynesian model as in Wood-
ford (2003) by adding an oil market. There are two countries in this model: an
oil-importer and an oil-exporter. The oil-importing country uses oil as an input in
12
the production of intermediate goods. Oil is supplied by the oil-exporting country,
who receives a random endowment in each period. The oil-exporting country uses oil
income to purchase the end product of the oil-importing country.
1.3.1 The Oil-Importing Country
The oil-importing country consists of households, intermediate good producers, final
good producers and storage operators. Oil is used in the production of intermediate
goods, which are produced in a monopolistic market. Oil is sold both at the spot and
the futures market.
The Final Good Sector
Final goods are produced in a perfectly competitive market by using a continuum
of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods as inputs. The technology is defined by Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregation formula,
Qt =
￿ ￿ 1
0
Qt(i)
ε−1
ε di
￿ ε
ε−1
(1.1)
Profit-maximization and zero-profit conditions for these firms imply that the de-
mand for intermediate good Qt(i) and the aggregate price level Pt are
Qt(i) =
￿Pt(i)
Pt
￿−ε
Qt (1.2)
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Pt =
￿ ￿ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ε di
￿ 1
1−ε
(1.3)
The Intermediate Good Sector
There is a continuum of firms producing diﬀerent varieties of intermediate goods
under monopolistic competition. These firms have monopoly power over their output
prices; however, they compete for inputs on competitive factor markets. Therefore,
they act as price takers on factor markets, including the oil market. Besides, since
these firms are very small, they take aggregate variables as given. The production
function for an intermediate good producer type of i takes the following Cobb-Douglas
form:
Qt(i) = AtKt(i)
αkLt(i)
αlOt(i)
αo (1.4)
Intermediate good producers are exposed to a common technological shock, At,
which evolves exogenously according to at = ηaat−1 + ξa,t, where at ≡ logAt and ξa,t
is a white noise with zero mean and σ2a variance.
Price Setting
Intermediate good producers operate in a monopolistically competitive market. We
follow the literature on sticky-price models (Calvo (1983), Yun (1996)) and assume
14
that although the firms have monopoly power over their own prices, they reset their
prices only infrequently. At time t, only 1 − θ fraction of firms adjust their prices.
The rest of the firms cannot adjust their prices and therefore set Pt(i) = Pt−1(i).
A firm will maximize the expected discounted flow of future profits, if it gets a
chance to change its price Pt(i). The intermediate firm’s problem in the goods market
is as follows:
maxP˜t(i)Et Σ
∞
k=0(θ)
kΛt,t+k[P˜t(i)Qt+k(i)− Pt+kmct+kQt+k(i)]
subject to downward-sloping demand function
Qt+k(i) =
￿
P˜t(i)
Pt+k
￿−ε
Qt+k
where Qt+k(i) is the demand for output produced by the firm i, and Λt,t+k is the
discount factor for the future nominal profits.
Futures Market:
Intermediate good producers also have access to the financial markets. In order to
avoid uncertainty about future supply and about the price of oil, they buy futures
contracts (Xt) supplied by storage operators∗. As we discuss in next section, there is
∗We state two diﬀerent maximization problems for intermediate goods producers: goods market
and futures market. However, one may suggest combining these problems. In other words, in
addition to factor inputs, in each period firms can simultaneously choose the fraction of futures to
be delivered, instead of settling by cash payment. In this case, firms will buy oil from the spot
market if they need any in excess of the futures contracts provide them. However, we found out that
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no delivery in the futures market. Firms incur a profit (lost), if the price for futures
fixed at t to be delivered at t + 1 is less (higher) than the spot price of oil at t + 1.
The intermediate firm’s problem in the futures market is:
max
Xt
E0Σ
∞
t=0(
1
1 + rt
)t
￿P ot+1
Pt+1
− Ft
Pt+1
￿
Xt
Storage Operators
Storage operators buy oil at spot market to fill their inventories. we assume that the
storage operators are risk-neutral, so all inventory is hedged by taking a long position
in the oil futures market. This implies that at time t the storage operator promises
to sell a certain amount of oil forFt at time t+ 1. However, in the model there is no
delivery, but only cash settlement. The operator sells all the inventory carried from
previous period at the spot market (P ot It), settles the cash payments with the futures
contract holders ((Ft−1 − P ot )It), and chooses the amount of inventory for the next
period (It+1). Besides, following the commodity pricing literature (Pindyck (2001)),
we introduce the convenience yield, g(It, σ2), which refers to the flow of benefits to
the inventory holders. These benefits arise from the fact that in the case of supply
disruptions, the inventories can help to satisfy the demand in the market and smooth
the production process. Therefore, the convenience yield is increasing in the level
the governing equations for this problem are the same as in maximizing two diﬀerent problems.
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of inventories (g1(It, σ2t ) > 0)
†, but the marginal convenience yield of an additional
inventory is decreasing (g11(It, σ2t ) < 0). Additionally, since higher uncertainty about
the future oil supply (high σ2t ) is more like to cause scarcity in the market, the
marginal convenience yield is increasing (g12(It, σ2t ) > 0) in σ
2
t . Lastly, in order to
ensure that the level of inventories is always positive, we assume that Inada condition
limIt→0 g1(It, σ2t ) =∞ holds. The optimization problem for the storage operator is:
max
It+1
E0Σ
∞
t=0(
1
1 + rt
)t
￿Ft−1
Pt
It − P
o
t
Pt
It+1 + gt(It+1, σt+1)
￿
(1.5)
The first-order condition for this problem yields the no-arbitrage condition for the
storage market:
Et
￿ 1
1 + rt
Ft
Pt+1
￿
=
P ot
Pt
− g1(It+1, σt+1) (1.6)
Households
A representative household in the oil-importing country maximizes the following util-
ity function:
E0 Σ
∞
t=0β
t
￿
logCt − L
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
￿
(1.7)
†We denote gi as the derivative of g with respect to ith term, where gij implies cross-sectional
derivative of g with respect to i and j.
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Households earn labor income wtPtLt, invest in risk-free bonds Bt+1, collect rent
rkt PtK¯t from intermediate good producers and dividends Πt
f for their ownership in
the firms.‡
PtCt +Bt+1 = Rt−1Bt + wtPtLt + Ptrkt K¯t + Πt
f (1.8)
Maximizing the utility function with respect to Ct, Bt and Lt will give us the following
first-order conditions:
CtLt
ψ = wt (1.9)
1
Ct
= βEt
￿ 1
Ct+1
RtPt
Pt+1
￿
(1.10)
Equation(9) and (10) jointly characterizes the household’s decision rules for consump-
tion, labor supply and bond holding.
1.3.2 Monetary Policy
We assume that the monetary authority in the oil-importing country follows a stan-
dard Taylor-type interest rate rule similar to the one estimated by Clarida et al.
‡Note that the aggregate capital stock is fixed at K¯t. Since the eﬀects of oil price shocks on
macro variables last 4-5 quarters at most, it is plausible to assume that capital is fixed.
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(2000) to characterize the historical U.S. monetary policy. This policy sets the nom-
inal interest rate for the risk-free bond to adjust output-inflation gap.
Rˆt − φRRˆt−1 = (1− φR)φππt + (1− φR)φyyˆt (1.11)
where Rˆt is the log deviation from steady-state nominal interest rate level (R¯), πt =
logPt/Pt−1 and yˆt is the log deviation of value-added from its steady state value.
Since there is no cross-border borrowing, the value-added (GDP) in the oil-importing
country will be
Yt = Ct = Qt − potΩt (1.12)
1.3.3 Oil-Exporting Country
The oil-exporting country is modeled as an endowment economy. In each period, it
receives a random oil endowment Ωt. Oil revenues are used to buy consumption goods
produced in the oil-importing country. The oil-exporting country acts as a price-taker
in spot market for oil and uses revenues to buy consumption goods from final goods
producers.
PtCt
F = Pt
oΩt (1.13)
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In order to disentangle “news” (variance) shock from the actual supply (mean) shock,
I assume that the percentage deviation of the stochastic oil endowment from its steady
state (ωˆt ≡ ln(Ωt)− ln(Ω¯)) has the following property:
ωˆt+1 = ρωˆt + ξt+1 (1.14)
ξt+1 = utεt+1 (1.15)
ut = λut−1 + σuηt (1.16)
To be more concise, if there is no “news” , (ηt = 0), or in other words no uncertainty
about the future availability of the oil supply, the oil endowment will be at steady-
state level. On the other hand, if there is a “news shock” at time t (ηt > 0), the
variance of the ωˆt+1 will be positive. However, this does not necessarily imply that
the supply will be less at t + 1, since there is a chance that the “news” will not be
realized. In that case, agents will update their beliefs about the future (scale by
λ < 1), and become less concerned.
1.4 Equilibrium, Market Clearing and Aggregation
1.4.1 Sticky-price Equilibrium
We assume a symmetric monopolistic competition equilibrium in which all intermedi-
ate good producing firms have identical behavior. In this equilibrium, at a given time
some of the intermediate good producing firms cannot adjust their prices. However,
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those firms that optimize their profits, decide to charge the same price P˜t. Therefore,
the aggregate price index will be:
Pt = [(1− θ)P˜t1−ε + θP 1−εt−1 ]
1
1−ε (1.17)
If we denote p˜t =
P˜t
Pt
, then
p˜t =
￿1− θπ¯ε−1t
1− θ
￿ 1
1−ε
(1.18)
1.4.2 Aggregation
Aggregate price dispersion has a distortionary eﬀect on the aggregate output. If we
denote aggregate price dispersion by ∆t =
￿ 1
0 (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εdi, aggregate output will be the
following:
Qt =
AtKt
αkLαlt O
αo
t
∆t
(1.19)
where
Lt =
￿ 1
0
Lt(i) di (1.20)
Kt =
￿ 1
0
Kt(i) di (1.21)
Ot =
￿ 1
0
Ot(i) di (1.22)
In the production factors market, monopolistic distortion caused by the interme-
diate good producing firms implies that labor, capital and oil are paid below their
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marginal product.
wtLt = αlmctQt∆t (1.23)
rktKt = αkmctQt∆t (1.24)
potOt = αomctQt∆t (1.25)
where real marginal cost mct =
pot
αowtαlrkt
αk
Atαoαoαl
αlαk
αk
is common for all firms. Under flexible
prices, monopoly distortion measured bymct is constant and less than unity. However,
when prices are sticky, it responds to the real and nominal shocks in the economy.
Therefore, an oil price shock aﬀects the inputs market through the perturbation in
mct.
Optimal price-setting decision (P˜t) by an intermediate good producing firm is
governed by the following equations:
P˜t
Pt
≡ p˜t =
EtΣ∞k=0(βθ)
k Qt+k
Ct+k
X−εt,k
ε
ε−1mct+k
EtΣ∞k=0(βθ)k
Qt+k
Ct+k
X1−εt,k
≡ Nt
Dt
(1.26)
Nt =
ε
ε− 1mct
Qt
Ct
+ βθEtπ¯
ε
t+1Nt+1 (1.27)
Dt =
Qt
Ct
+ βθEtπ¯
ε
t+1Dt+1 (1.28)
Decision rules for the intermediate firms and the storage operators in the finan-
cial mar- kets, which determine the equilibrium level of oil inventories and futures
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contracts, are characterized by the following equations:
Et (p
o
t+1) = Et (
Ft
Pt+1
) (1.29)
Et
￿ 1
1 + rt
Ft
Pt+1
￿
= pot − g1(It+1, σ2t+1) (1.30)
1.4.3 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, net supply of risk-less bonds should be zero. Besides, since there is
no capital accumulation, aggregate demand for capital is equal to the fixed supply.
Bt = 0 (1.31)
Kt = 1 (1.32)
In the oil market, oil supply is determined by the stochastic endowment (Ωt) and
the change in the level of inventories (∆It+1). Therefore, the aggregate demand for
oil, Ot, is equal to Ωt −∆It+1.
The oil-exporting country spends all the oil revenues on consumption good pro-
duced by the final good producers in the oil-importing country. Therefore, in the
equilibrium, goods market clearing implies:
CFt = p
o
tOt (1.33)
CFt + Ct = Qt (1.34)
23
1.5 Calibration and Results
We follow the literature to calibrate the parameters for the utility and production
functions. We set β = 0.99 corresponding to %4 annual steady-state real interest rate.
Utility is logarithmic and the parameter ψ = 1 implying unit Frisch labor elasticity.
There is no capital accumulation in the model, so the aggregate level of capital, K¯,
is set to 1. The labor, capital and oil elasticities of gross output are set to 0.63,
0.32 and 0.05, respectively. The elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods,
ε, is set to 7.66 to match a steady-state price mark-up of %15 implying µ = 1.15.
Together with the oil elasticity of gross output, αo = 0.05, the price mark-up matches
the average oil consumption share of U.S. GDP, which is 0.04. We assume that the
intermediate firms can optimize their profits only once a year, so the Calvo price
adjustment parameter, θ, is set to 0.75.
For the baseline analysis, we calibrate the monetary policy using the findings
Orphanides (2001). Therefore, we set our baseline parameters to φR = 0.79, φπ = 1.8
and φy = 0.27. We will later simulate the model using alternative policies by changing
the coeﬃcients of the interest rate smoothing parameter and the coeﬃcients of the
contemporaneous inflation and the log-deviation of the output.
The persistence parameters for the technology (η), oil endowment (ρ) and the
variance (λ) shocks are all set to 0.5. The calibration of these parameters do not
have any significant qualitative eﬀect on the results, as long as they are set positive
numbers less than one.
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Following Gorton et al. (2007), we set the marginal convenience yield parameter
for the inventory at -130. The steady-state value of oil endowment and the inventory
are chosen to be 0.5 and 0.05.
We solve the model by taking second-order Taylor expansion around deterministic
steady-state with zero inflation in order to capture the variance eﬀect and calculate
impulse response functions for the specific shocks. To be more precise, the solution
method follows the algorithm proposed by Benigno et al. (2010), which proposes a
second-order approximation method for the solution of the dynamic stochastic models,
where exogenous state variables display time-varying risk.
1.5.1 Precautionary Demand Shock
We model precautionary demand shock as a “news shock” to the variance of oil en-
dowment. Once there is a shock to the σt+1, firms become worried about the future
availability of the oil supply and demand more futures contracts to oﬀset that un-
certainty. On the other hand, the storage operators increase their inventories to sell
more futures contracts. In order to show formally how the uncertainty about future
oil supply may increase the real spot price oil, we solve the maximization problem
for the storage operators and the intermediate good producing firms, and aggregate
production to get the following equation:
mctQ
￿(Ωt −∆It+1)￿ ￿￿ ￿
po,t
= Et[
1
1 + rt
mct+1Q
￿(Ωt+1 −∆It+2)￿ ￿￿ ￿
po,t+1
] + g1(It+1, σt+1) (1.35)
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When there is a “news shock” at time t, not followed by any change in the mean at
time t+ 1 (i.e. no realization), right-hand side of the equation goes up, since g12 > 0
and E[Q￿(· )] is disturbed upward by Jensen inequality as Q￿(·) is convex. In order
to oﬀset that wedge, the level of inventory holdings decided to hold at time t to be
used at time t + 1, It+1, will increase to raise the left-hand side through ∆It+1 and
lower the right-hand side of the equation through ∆It+2 and g1(·). Meantime, we will
observe a spike in the real spot price of oil, po,t, since it is equal to mctQ￿(Ωt−∆It+1).
Figure 1.3 : Shock to the variance (ηt = 1), no realization (εt = 0 for all t)
We simulate the model with the benchmark Taylor-rule estimated by Orphanides
(2001) using real-time data for 1979:1995. Figure 1.3 shows the dynamics of inflation,
percentage deviation of GDP, inventory, real oil price and interest rates from their
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steady state values responding one standard deviation in σt+1.
In accordance with the model, changes in inflation, inventories and oil price are
positive and output is negative at the first period. However, they turn to negative
(positive for output) during the second period, since oil supply shortfall does not
occur. The level of oil inventories do not return to the steady-state level immediately,
since there is still concern, although less, about t + 2. Besides, the amount of oil in
the economy, Ω−∆It+2 is higher than its steady state value, so the spot price of oil
and inflation are below and output above their steady-state values. Oil abundance
lasts as long as the uncertainty is not vanished and oil supply shortfall does not occur.
It is also worth mention that the dynamics of marginal convenience yield (denoted
by MCY in Figure 1.3) shows how markets can operate in contango. In other words,
futures price can go above expected future spot price because of high uncertainty in
supply and decline back overtime to converge to the future spot price. High marginal
convenience yield realized at time t oﬀsets the loss of storage operators incurred at
t+ 1 due to lower future spot price of oil.
The diﬀerence can be seen in Figure 1.4, where an uncertainty shock at time t is
followed by a supply shock at time t + 1. Since there is no more oil abundance in
the economy during the later periods, inflation and oil price stay above and output
below their steady-state values.
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Figure 1.4 : Shock to the variance (ηt = 1) followed by a shock to the mean (εt+1 =
−1)
1.6 Conclusion
In this study we model and quantify the eﬀect of uncertainty about future availability
of oil supply on the macroeconomic variables. Our setup allows us to separate mean
eﬀect (supply shock) from variance shock (uncertainty eﬀect). Under baseline Taylor-
type interest rate rule, real oil price,inflation and output loss overshoot during the
first period, but go down below steady state during the next period if uncertainties
are not realized. However, if this shock is realized, i.e. followed by an actual supply
shock, the eﬀect on inflation and output loss is high and persistent.
28
Chapter 2
Oil Price Shocks and Monetary Policy: The Role
of Storage
2.1 Introduction
Some recent literature suggests that although high oil prices contributed to recessions,
they have never had a pivotal role in the creation of those economic downturns. A
general consensus is that the decline in output and employment was due to the rise
in interest rates, resulting from the Fed’s endogenous response to the higher inflation
induced by oil price shocks, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 : Real oil prices, US Recessions and Federal Funds Rate
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In this vein, Bernanke et al. (1997) argued that much of the decline in output and
employment was due to the rise in interest rates, resulting from the Feds endogenous
response to the higher inflation induced by oil price shocks. Leduc and Sill (2004)
and Carsltrom and Fuerst (2006) calibrated a stochastic general equilibrium model in
which oil was used as an input in production. They run counter-factual experiments
to explore the role of alternative monetary policies in exacerbating or easing the
response of economy to oil price shocks. They concluded that the Fed could pursue a
diﬀerent monetary policy and dampen the recessionary eﬀects of those shocks. Barsky
and Kilian (2001) claimed that stagflation may have been partly caused by exogenous
changes in monetary policy, which coincided in time with the rise in oil prices.
However, all these papers assume that oil price shocks are exogenous to the U.S
economy. In this regard, a model with an endogenous (demand shock) or exogenous
(supply shock) price shock may produce a totally diﬀerent monetary policy proposal
when there exists a market for crude oil storage. Frankel (2008) shows the high cor-
relation between commodity prices and the real interest rates. The rationale behind
this idea is that when good prices are sticky in the economy, the monetary authority
can aﬀect the level of inventory through the changes in real interest rates. Although
the monetary authority can only set nominal interest rates, when good prices are
sticky, in the short-run these changes in the nominal interest rates will also aﬀect real
interest rates. Thus, lower real interest rates, as proposed in the literature to ease the
adverse eﬀects of oil price shocks, decrease the cost of inventories, so they decrease
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the incentive to extract today and/or increase storage operators desire to carry more
inventory. This, in turn, decreases the quantity of oil supplied in the market and
increases the spot price of oil. Therefore, an optimal monetary policy that maximizes
the welfare in the economy should consider the adverse aﬀect of low interest rates on
the crude oil market. Based on these facts, I build a standard cashless DSGE model
with sticky prices to study the monetary policy implications of oil price shocks. Fol-
lowing the commodity pricing and storage literature, I include both spot and storage
market for oil, where storage operators store the oil and sell in the futures market.
I analyze the role of alternative monetary policies in amplifying or dampening the
economys response to oil price shocks and calculate the optimal welfare-maximizing
monetary policy and optimal operational simple rule that mimics the optimal plan.
We run counter-factual experiments to explore whether the recessionary conse-
quences of oil price shocks can be eliminated or dampened by another rule. In contrast
with the literature, which ignores storage and financial markets, we find that neither
the interest-rate peg (Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)) nor the low-interest rate
rules (Leduc and Sill (2004)) clearly dominates other interest-rate rules. Instead, op-
timal monetary policy dictates the higher nominal interest rates as a response to an
oil price shock, regardless of the source. However, the source of the shock plays an
important role in determining the magnitude and variation of the nominal interest
rate.
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2.2 Literature Review
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Energy Information Admin-
istration, between 1970 and 2005, residential and commercial and industrial energy
consumption was on average 4.8% and 4% of GDP, respectively. Based on this fact,
one may reasonably conclude that any change in oil prices can only cause a small
drop in GDP, not necessarily lead to a recession. However, Hamilton (2005) points
out that nine out of ten of the U.S. recessions since World War II and every recession
since 1973 were preceded by a spike in oil prices. This led researchers to look for
a transmission mechanism that possibly exaggerated the adverse eﬀects of oil price
shocks. Among several explanations including real wage rigidity and capital-energy
complementarity; tight monetary policy is the one most likely to blame for amplifying
macroeconomic downfalls in the advent of oil price increases.
Early empirical work by Bernanke et al. (1997), claimed that recessionary eﬀects
of the oil price shocks could actually be eliminated, if the Fed followed a neutral policy
such as interest-rate peg. However, the claims were criticized in the literature, as the
Lucas critique advocates running alternative policy experiments with reduced form
estimates may not produce correct results. Leduc and Sill (2004) was the first paper
to study the contribution of monetary policy using a calibrated general equilibrium
model. According to Leduc and Sill (2004), fixed nominal interest rate rule is not
capable of fully eliminating the adverse eﬀects of oil price shocks. Among the sample
of reasonable monetary policy rules, their results favor the one targeting the general
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price level of the economy (weighted average of core inflation and the percentage
change in oil price).
Kilian and Lewis (2011) claim there is no evidence that the monetary authority
was responding to oil price shocks before 1987, although the changes in federal funds
rate and oil prices coincided during the spikes in the latter oil price shocks. However,
during the post-1987 period, they also found that the monetary authority was using
federal funds rate to cope with inflation triggered by an oil price shock, rather than
responding to that shock directly.
Wrinkler (2009) calculated optimal monetary policy response to an anticipated
and an unanticipated oil price shock and concluded that the optimal policy dictates
a larger drop in output compared with the historical Taylor-rule. He also claims
that divine coincidence∗, controlling both the inflation and output gap at the same
time, is not practical anymore, as optimal policy is not capable of stabilizing both
simultaneously.
Lastly, Bodenstein et al. (2012), a multi-country DSGE model, estimates the op-
timal monetary response (welfare-maximizing) to the endogenous and the exogenous
oil price shocks. Their main finding is that no oil price shock requires the same mon-
etary response. Therefore, the monetary authority should disentangle the source of
the shock before formulating any response. Lastly, they claim that optimal monetary
policy calls for a higher weight on output gap and less on inflation compared to the
∗See Blanchard and Gali (2007b) for more details on ’divine coincidence’.
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historical monetary policy rule estimated from the data. A similar conclusion was
drawn by Nakov and Pescatori (2010), who modeled an oil market consisting of a
dominant producer that sets the monopoly price and many fringe competitors. They
also claim it is not welfare-maximizing to respond directly to the oil price fluctuations,
but rather to respond to inflation and output gap associated with those fluctuations.
Bodenstein et al. (2012) is the closest study to ours, as it focuses on the source
of the shocks while formulating the optimal policy response. This paper, however,
also takes into account the storage market for oil in addition to a standard spot
market and builds a model where agents can buy oil futures to oﬀset any future
uncertainty about the price and quantity of oil. First, our setup allows analyzing
the macroeconomic dynamics and monetary policy implications for the precautionary
demand shocks triggered by the uncertainty about future availability of oil. Second, it
takes into account additional transmission channels for the monetary policy through
the storage market. In other words, since the cost of storage directly depends on
the real interest rates, monetary authority can influence it by manipulating nominal
interest rate when prices are sticky.
2.3 The Model
This study extends the standard cashless Dynamic New Keynesian model as in Wood-
ford (2003) by adding an oil market. The are two countries in this model: an oil-
importer and an oil-exporter. The oil-importing country uses oil as an input in the
34
production of intermediate goods. Oil is supplied by the oil-exporting country, who re-
ceives a random endowment in each period. The oil-exporting country uses oil income
to purchase the final good produced by the final good producers in the oil-importing
country.
2.3.1 The Oil-Importing Country
The oil-importing country consists of households, intermediate good producers, final
good producers and storage operators. Oil is used in the production of intermediate
goods, which are produced in a monopolistically competitive market. Oil is sold both
at the spot and the futures market.
The Final Good Sector
Final good is produced under perfect competition using continuum of diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods as inputs. The technology is defined by Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation
formula,
Qt =
￿ ￿ 1
0
Qt(i)
ε−1
ε di
￿ ε
ε−1
(2.1)
Profit-maximization and zero-profit condition for these firms implies that the de-
mand for intermediate good Qt(i) and the aggregate price level Pt are
Qt(i) =
￿Pt(i)
Pt
￿−ε
Qt (2.2)
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Pt =
￿ ￿ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ε di
￿ 1
1−ε
(2.3)
The Intermediate Good Sector
There is a continuum of firms producing diﬀerent varieties of intermediate goods
under monopolistic competition. These firms have monopoly power over their output
prices, however, they compete for inputs on competitive factor markets. Therefore,
they act as price takers on factor markets, including the oil market. Besides, since
these firms are very small, they take aggregate variables as given. The production
function for an intermediate good producer type of i takes the following Cobb-Douglas
form:
Qt(i) = AtKt(i)
αkLt(i)
αlOt(i)
αo (2.4)
Intermediate good producers are exposed to a common technological shock, At,
which evolves exogenously according to at = ηaat−1 + ξa,t, where at ≡ logAt and ξa,t
is a white noise with zero mean and σ2a variance.
Price Setting
Intermediate good producers operate in a monopolistically competitive market. I
follow the literature on sticky-price models (Calvo (1983), Yun (1996)) and assume
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that although the firms have monopoly power over their own prices, they reset their
prices only infrequently. At time t, only 1 − θ fraction of firms adjust their prices.
The rest of the firms cannot adjust their prices and therefore set Pt(i) = Pt−1(i).
A firm will maximize the expected discounted flow of future profits, if it gets a
chance to change its price Pt(i). The intermediate firm’s problem in the goods market
is as follows:
maxP˜t(i)Et Σ
∞
k=0(θ)
kΛt,t+k[P˜t(i)Qt+k(i)− Pt+kmct+kQt+k(i)]
subject to downward-sloping demand function
Qt+k(i) =
￿
P˜t(i)
Pt+k
￿−ε
Qt+k
where Qt+k(i) is the demand for output produced by the firm i, and Λt,t+k is the
discount factor for the future nominal profits.
Futures Market:
Intermediate good producers also have an access to the financial markets. In order
to avoid uncertainty about future supply and about the price of oil, they buy futures
contracts (Xt) supplied by storage operators†. As I discuss in next section, there is
†I state two diﬀerent maximization problem for intermediate good producers: goods market and
futures market. However, one may suggest to combine these problems. In other words, in addition to
factor inputs, in each period firms can simultaneously choose the fraction of futures to be delivered,
instead of settled by cash payment. In this case, firms will buy oil from the spot market if they
need any in excess of the futures contracts provide them. However, I found out that the governing
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no delivery in the futures market. Firms incur a profit (lost), if the price for futures
fixed at t to be delivered at t + 1 is less (higher) than the spot price of oil at t + 1.
The intermediate firm’s problem in the futures market is:
max
Xt
E0Σ
∞
t=0(
1
1 + rt
)t
￿P ot+1
Pt+1
− Ft
Pt+1
￿
Xt
Storage Operators
Storage operators buy oil at spot market to fill their inventories. I assume that the
storage operators are risk-neutral, so all inventory is hedged by taking a long position
in the oil futures market. This implies that at time t the storage operator promises
to sell a certain amount of oil for Ft at time t+ 1. However, in the model there is no
delivery, but only cash settlement. The operator sells all the inventory carried from
previous period at the spot market (P ot It), settles the cash payments with the futures
contract holders ((Ft−1 − P ot )It), and chooses the amount of inventory for the next
period (It+1). Besides, following the commodity pricing literature (Pindyck (2001),
we introduce the convenience yield, g(It, σ2), which refers to the flow of benefits to
the inventory holders. These benefits arise from the fact that in the case of supply
disruptions, the inventories can help to satisfy the demand in the market and smooth
the production process. Therefore, the convenience yield is increasing in the level
equations for this problem are the same as in maximizing two diﬀerent problems.
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of inventories (g1(It, σ2t ) > 0)
‡, but the marginal convenience yield of an additional
inventory is decreasing (g11(It, σ2t ) < 0). Additionally, since higher uncertainty about
the future oil supply (high σ2t ) is more like to cause scarcity in the market, the
marginal convenience yield is increasing (g12(It, σ2t ) > 0) in σ
2
t . Lastly, in order to
ensure that the level of inventories is always positive, we assume that Inada condition
limIt→0 g1(It, σ2t ) =∞ holds. The optimization problem for the storage operator is:
max
It+1
E0Σ
∞
t=0(
1
1 + rt
)t
￿Ft−1
Pt
It − P
o
t
Pt
It+1 + gt(It+1, σt+1)
￿
(2.5)
The first-order condition for this problem yields the no-arbitrage condition for the
storage market:
Et
￿ 1
1 + rt
Ft
Pt+1
￿
=
P ot
Pt
− g1(It+1, σt+1) (2.6)
Households
A representative household in the oil-importing country maximizes the following util-
ity function:
E0 Σ
∞
t=0β
t
￿
logCt − L
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
￿
(2.7)
‡We denote gi as the derivative of g with respect to ith term, where gij implies cross-sectional
derivative of g with respect to i and j.
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Households earn labor income wtPtLt, invest in risk-free bonds Bt+1, collect rent
rkt PtK¯t from intermediate good producers and dividends Πt
f for their ownership in
the firms.§
PtCt +Bt+1 = Rt−1Bt + wtPtLt + Ptrkt K¯t + Πt
f (2.8)
Maximizing the utility function with respect to Ct, Bt and Lt will give us the following
first-order conditions:
CtLt
ψ = wt (2.9)
1
Ct
= βEt
￿ 1
Ct+1
RtPt
Pt+1
￿
(2.10)
Equation(9) and (10) jointly characterizes the household’s decision rules for consump-
tion, labor supply and bond holding.
2.3.2 Monetary Policy
We assume that the monetary authority in the oil-importing country follows a stan-
dard Taylor-type interest rate rule is similar to the one estimated by Clarida et al.
§Note that the aggregate capital stock is fixed at K¯t. Since the eﬀects of oil price shocks on
macro variables last 4-5 quarters at most, it is plausible to assume that capital is fixed.
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(2000) to characterize the historical U.S. monetary policy. This policy sets the nom-
inal interest rate for the risk-free bond to adjust output-inflation gap.
Rˆt − φRRˆt−1 = (1− φR)φππt + (1− φR)φyyˆt (2.11)
where Rˆt is the log deviation from steady-state nominal interest rate level (R¯), πt =
logPt/Pt−1 and yˆt is the log deviation of value-added from its steady state value.
Since there is no cross-border borrowing, the value-added (GDP) in the oil-importing
country will be
Yt = Ct = Qt − potΩt (2.12)
2.3.3 Oil-Exporting Country
The oil-exporting country is modelled as an endowment economy and acts as a price-
taker in the spot market for oil. In each period, it receives a random oil endowment
Ωt. Oil revenues are used to buy consumption good produced in the oil-importing
country.
In each period, the oil-exporting country acts as a price-taker in spot market for oil
and uses revenues to buy consumption goods from final good procuders.
PtCt
F = Pt
oΩt (2.13)
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In order to disentangle “news shock” from the mean shock, I assume that the percent-
age deviation of the stochastic oil endowment from its steady state (ωˆt ≡ ln(Ωt) −
ln(Ω¯)) has the following property:
ωˆt+1 = ρωˆt + ξt+1 (2.14)
ξt+1 = utεt+1 (2.15)
ut = λut−1 + σuηt (2.16)
To be more concise, if there is no “news”, (ηt = 0), or in other words no uncertainty
about the future availability of the oil supply, the oil endowment will be at steady-
state level. On the other hand, if there is a “news shock” at time t (ηt > 0), the
variance of the ωˆt+1 will be positive. However, this does not neccesarily imply that
the supply will be less at t+1, since there is a chance that the “news shock” will not
be realized. In that case, agents will update their beliefs about the future (scale by
λ < 1), and become less concerned.
2.4 Equilibrium, Market Clearing and Aggregation
2.4.1 Sticky-price Equilibrium
We assume a symmetric monopolistic competition equilibrium in which all intermedi-
ate good producing firms have identical behavior. In this equilibrium, at a given time
some of the intermediate good producing firms cannot adjust their prices. However,
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those firms that optimize their profits, decide to charge the same price P˜t. Therefore,
the aggregate price index will be:
Pt = [(1− θ)P˜t1−ε + θP 1−εt−1 ]
1
1−ε (2.17)
If we denote p˜t =
P˜t
Pt
, then
p˜t =
￿1− θπ¯ε−1t
1− θ
￿ 1
1−ε
(2.18)
2.4.2 Aggregation
Aggregate price dispersion has a distortionary eﬀect on the aggregate output. If we
denote aggregate price dispersion by ∆t =
￿ 1
0 (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εdi, aggregate output will be the
following:
Qt =
AtKt
αkLαlt O
αo
t
∆t
(2.19)
where
Lt =
￿ 1
0
Lt(i) di (2.20)
Kt =
￿ 1
0
Kt(i) di (2.21)
Ot =
￿ 1
0
Ot(i) di (2.22)
In the production factors market, monopolistic distortion caused by the interme-
diate good producing firms implies that labor, capital and oil are paid below their
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marginal product.
wtLt = αlmctQt∆t (2.23)
rktKt = αkmctQt∆t (2.24)
potOt = αomctQt∆t (2.25)
where real marginal cost mct =
pot
αowtαlrkt
αk
Atαoαoαl
αlαk
αk
is common for all firms. Under flexible
prices, monopoly distortion measured bymct is constant and less than unity. However,
when prices are sticky, it responds to the real and nominal shocks in the economy.
Therefore, an oil price shock aﬀects the inputs market through the perturbation in
mct.
Optimal price-setting decision (P˜t) by an intermediate good producing firm is
governed by the following equations:
P˜t
Pt
≡ p˜t =
EtΣ∞k=0(βθ)
k Qt+k
Ct+k
X−εt,k
ε
ε−1mct+k
EtΣ∞k=0(βθ)k
Qt+k
Ct+k
X1−εt,k
≡ Nt
Dt
(2.26)
Nt =
ε
ε− 1mct
Qt
Ct
+ βθEtπ¯
ε
t+1Nt+1 (2.27)
Dt =
Qt
Ct
+ βθEtπ¯
ε
t+1Dt+1 (2.28)
Decision rules for the intermediate firms and the storage operators in the financial
markets, which determine the equilibrium level of oil inventories and futures contracts,
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are characterized by the following equations:
Et (p
o
t+1) = Et (
Ft
Pt+1
) (2.29)
Et
￿ 1
1 + rt
Ft
Pt+1
￿
= pot − g1(It+1, σ2t+1) (2.30)
2.4.3 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, net supply of riskless bonds should be zero. Besides, since there is no
capital accumulation, aggregate demand for capital is equal to the fixed supply.
Bt = 0 (2.31)
Kt = 1 (2.32)
In the oil market, oil supply is determined by the stochastic endowment (Ωt) and
the change in the level of inventories (∆It+1). Therefore, the aggregate demand for
oil, Ot, is equal to Ωt −∆It+1.
The oil-exporting country spends all the oil revenues on consumption good pro-
duced by the final good producers in the oil-importing country. Therefore, in the
equilibrium, goods market clearing implies:
CFt = p
o
tOt (2.33)
CFt + Ct = Qt (2.34)
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2.5 Calibration and Results
We follow the literature to calibrate the parameters for the utility and production
functions. We set β = 0.99 corresponding to %4 annual steady-state real interest rate.
Utility is logarithmic and the parameter ψ = 1 implying unit Frisch labor elasticity.
There is no capital accumulation in the model, so the aggregate level of capital, K¯,
is set to 1. The labor, capital and oil elasticities of gross output are set to 0.63,
0.32 and 0.05, respectively. The elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods,
ε, is set to 7.66 to match a steady-state price mark-up of %15 implying µ = 1.15.
Together with the oil elasticity of gross output, αo = 0.05, the price mark-up matches
the average oil consumption share of U.S. GDP, which is 0.04. We assume that the
intermediate firms can optimize their profits only once a year, so the Calvo price
adjustment parameter, θ, is set to 0.75.
For the baseline analysis, we calibrate the monetary policy using the findings
Orphanides (2004). Therefore, we set our baseline parameters to φR = 0.79, φπ = 1.8
and φy = 0.27. We will later simulate the model using alternative policies by changing
the coeﬃcients of the interest rate smoothing parameter and the coeﬃcients of the
contemporaneous inflation and the log-deviation of the output.
The persistence parameters for the technology (η), oil endowment (ρ) and the
variance (λ) shocks are all set to 0.5. The calibration of these parameters do not
have any significant qualitative eﬀect on the results, as long as they are set positive
numbers less than one.
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Following Gorton et al. (2007), we set the marginal convenience yield parameters
for the inventory and the variance at -130 and 40, respectively. The steady-state
value of oil endowment and the inventory are chosen to be 0.5 and 0.05.
We solve the model by taking second-order Taylor expansion around deterministic
steady-state with zero inflation in order to capture the variance eﬀect and calculate
impulse response functions for the specific shocks. To be more precise, the solution
method follows the algorithm proposed by Benigno et al. (2010), which proposes a
second-order approximation method for the solution of the dynamic stochastic models,
where exogenous state variables display time-varying risk.
2.6 Alternative Monetary Policies
In this section we study the response of the economy to oil price shocks under diﬀerent
monetary policy specifications thus exploring the possibilities of systematic policy
in dampening or amplifying those adverse eﬀects on the macro economy. We run
counter-factual policy experiments similar to the literature to study the eﬀects of
monetary policy in a model with storage and financial markets. The existence of
storage and financial markets can, intuitively, lead to a diﬀerent policy proposal,
or change the ranking of those policies in terms of macroeconomic eﬀects. This is
because of the fact that when good prices are sticky, the monetary authority can
aﬀect real interest rate by just changing nominal interest rates, and thus encourage
or discourage the storage.
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Figure 2.2 : Shock to the variance (ηt = 1), no realization (￿t = 0 for all t).
The first column depicts each variables response to the shock as a function of the weight on output
deviations (φy) in the interest rate rules, while the second column similarly plots responses as a
function of the weight on inflation deviations (φπ).
First, we consider the macroeconomic consequences of diﬀerent oil price shocks
under diﬀerent Taylor-type interest rate rules. Namely, we fix one coeﬃcient to
its benchmark estimate by Orphanides (2001) and change the other one within the
reasonable range. First column of Figure 2.2, shows the responses of inflation, output
gap and interest rate where φπ is fixed to 1.8, but φy varies between 0 and 3. Similarly,
second column depicts the same dynamics for the fixed φy = 0.27, and φπ varying
between 1 and 3. The coeﬃcient of inflation should stay above 1 to get (locally)
unique equilibrium (Leduc and Sill (2004), Carsltrom and Fuerst (2006)).
Figure 2.2 shows that interest-rate rules that place a high weight on output gap
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lead to a lower inflation, but not a smaller output loss. Similarly, the rules with high
weight on inflation favor output, but also lead to a higher inflation rate.
Figure 2.3 : Shock to the mean only (εt = −1).
The first column depicts each variables response to the shock as a function of the weight on output
deviations (φy) in the interest rate rules, while the second column similarly plots responses as a
function of the weight on inflation deviations (φπ).
For a better understanding of the role of storage and financial markets, we simulate
the responses of output gap and inflation to an exogenous supply shock (mean eﬀect)
under the similar monetary policy variations. This will help us to compare our results
with the ones in the literature (Leduc and Sill (2004), Carsltrom and Fuerst (2006)).
Using the same parameters for the monetary policy, Leduc and Sill (2004) finds that
interest-rate rules that place a high weight on inflation and low weight on output
loss lead to a smaller output loss and inflation. Besides, these weights produce low
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interest rates. Thus, Leduc and Sill (2004) concluded that low interest-rate rules
dampen the recessionary consequences of an exogenous oil supply shock. However,
our model does not come up with a clear-cut ranking of the Taylor-type rules in terms
of inflation and output gap dynamics perturbed by a supply shock. In other words,
a high weight on output gap lowers the loss in output, but also leads to a higher
inflation. Similarly, a higher weight on inflation favors inflation, but exaggerates the
output loss. Therefore, we can conclude that monetary policy propositions made
with a model that lacks storage and financial markets (which is less realistic) can be
misleading.
Figure 2.4 : Shock to the variance (ηt = 1) followed by a shock to the mean (εt+1 =−1).
The first column depicts each variables response to the shock as a function of the weight on output
deviations (φy) in the interest rate rules, while the second column similarly plots responses as a
function of the weight on inflation deviations (φπ).
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Lastly, we run the same experiment (Figure 2.4) for an ”uncertainty shock” fol-
lowed by a supply shock and simulate the macroeconomic eﬀects. Still the results
are ambiguous in terms of better weights. However, this time we can conclude that
interest-rate rules that lead to a lower interest rate (high φy and low φπ) favors infla-
tion rate, and those leading to a higher interest rate (low φy and high φπ) dampens
the output loss.
Since there is not a clear-cut policy ranking within the family of Taylor-type rules
based on inflation and output loss dynamics, I perform a single measure ranking for
those rules by calculating conditional welfare associated with each combination of
(φy,φπ). I define the welfare associated with a interest-rate policy conditional on a
particular state of the economy in period 0 as following:
W0 = E0Σ
∞
t=0β
tU(Cat , L
a
t ) (2.35)
where {Cat }∞t=0 and {Lat }∞t=0 are defined as the sequences of consumption and labor
attained under the specific alternative monetary policies. Besides, we assume that the
economy starts from its steady-state value. Since the non-stochastic steady-state is
independent of the monetary policy, by setting all state variables equal to their non-
stochastic steady-state values at time zero, we assure that the economy begins from
the same initial point under all alternative policies. I evaluate the conditional welfare,
W0, to the second order of accuracy by taking second-order Taylor approximation
51
around non-stochastic steady-state¶:
W0 ￿ U(C,L)
1− β + Σ
∞
t=0β
t
￿
cˆt − 1
2
σ2ct − L1+ψ(lˆt +
1
2
ψσ2lt)
￿
(2.36)
where cˆt, lˆt, σ2ct and σ
2
lt are the log-deviation of consumption and labor from their
steady-state values and the variance of those variables, respectively.
Figure 2.5 depicts the conditional welfare as a function of (φy,φπ). In order to get a
better idea about the dynamics of conditional welfare, we also plot the maximum value
of conditional welfare for each φy (φπ) as a function of φπ (φy). For any given value of
φy, the conditional welfare improves as φπ increases. On the other hand, conditional
welfare is the highest value when φy=0 for any given value of φπ. Based on these
results, we also plot the nominal interest rate associated with the (φπ, φy) bundle
yielding the highest welfare. It is clear that a Taylor-type policy rule that responds
with a higher initial nominal interest rate leads to a higher level of conditional welfare.
Besides, this finding holds not only for the actual oil supply shock, but also for the
uncertainty shock with and without the realization. We did not include the plots here
for those shocks, since the results are very similar.
¶Benigno and Woodford (2004), Gali and Monacelli (2005) show how to derive loss function (the
weighted sum of inflation and output gap) from a second-order approximation of W0. However, we
do not have to derive a loss function for the purpose of the analysis in this paper, as we already have
a contingent sequence of {cˆt} and {lˆt} obtained by second-degree approximation to the solution of
the model under a given monetary policy.
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Figure 2.5 : Conditional Welfare and Nominal Interest Rate - Supply Shock.
The graphs depict the conditional welfare as a function of φπ and φy and the nominal interest rate
associated with the (φπ, φy) yielding the highest welfare.
2.7 Optimal Monetary Policy
To compute the optimal monetary policy, I solve the Ramsey problem. Follow-
ing the literature (Khan et al. (2003)), I define the optimal monetary policy as
a sequence of nominal interest rate, {Rt}∞t=1, that maximizes agents’ welfare sub-
ject to the first-order conditions for the households, the firms, the storage opera-
tors and the resource constraint given the exogenous processes for stochastic state
variables. The monetary authority maximizes the following Langragian with re-
spect to the Langrange multipliers, Λt = {γt,φt,ϕt,λt, ζt}, and the choice variables,
Υt = {Rt, Ct, Lt,mct, pot , Nt, Dt, It+1, π¯t}:
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max
Λt,Υt
E0
￿
Σ∞t=0β
t
￿
log(Ct)− L
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
+ γt(
1
Ct
− β Rt
π¯t+1Ct+1
)
+ φt(Nt − ε
ε− 1
mct
1− αomct − βθπ¯
ε
t+1Nt+1)
+ ϕt(Dt − 1
1− αomct − βθπ¯
ε−1
t+1Dt+1)
+ λt(Nt −Dt[1− θπ¯
ε−1
t
1− θ ]
1
1−ε )
+ ζt(g1(It+1, σ
2
t+1)− pot +
π¯t+1
Rt
pot+1)
￿￿
(2.37)
We assume that the government is able to commit to a policy plan set at time zero.
To obtain a time invariant commitment policy, we set initial values of predetermined
Langrange multipliers equal to their respective non-stochastic steady-state values:
φ−1 = φ (2.38)
ϕ−1 = ϕ (2.39)
γ−1 = γ (2.40)
ζ−1 = ζ (2.41)
Again, using the solution method proposed by Benigno et al. (2010), we find that
monetary authority overshoots nominal interest rate, output loss and the real oil price.
These are the similar dynamics that the economy performs under the benchmark
Taylor rule calibrated to the US historical monetary policy. As we can see in Figure
2.6, in the case of increased uncertainty about future oil supply such as “news” shock,
storage operators create scarcity in the market by hoarding oil inventories resulting
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Figure 2.6 : Optimal Monetary Policy - Shock to the variance only (ηt = 1)
in the real price of oil to spike. Since oil is used in the production, higher input prices
lowers demand for oil. On the other hand, labor demand goes down being aﬀected by
higher real marginal cost in intermediate goods production. The latter eﬀect would
not occur if the prices were flexible. However, under sticky prices the factor market
is distorted by the fluctuations in the real marginal cost. All these eﬀects combined
cause a 1.5% output loss during the first period.
However, unlike what we observed under the benchmark Taylor rule, inflation is
almost at zero level when the monetary authority employs the optimal policy. Al-
though the optimal monetary policy stabilizes the inflation by increasing nominal
interest rate more than the benchmark rule, it cannot avoid the 1.5% output loss.
During the next period, if supply disruption does not occur as in stochastic oil en-
dowment remaining at the steady-state level, storage operators update their beliefs
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about the future and become less concerned. Therefore they decrease the level of
oil inventory increasing the abundance of oil in the economy. The real oil price goes
below its steady-state level and, demand for labor increases, thus output climbs above
its steady-state level.
Figure 2.7 : Optimal Monetary Policy - Shock to the mean only (￿t = −1)
The eﬀects of actual supply shock (mean shock) on a macro economy under the
optimal monetary policy diﬀers from the eﬀects of uncertainty shock both in terms
of the dynamics and magnitude. Figure 2.7 shows that in the aftermath of a supply
shock, monetary policy sets nominal interest rate 2.5% above its steady-state value to
pacify the large and persistent macro eﬀects. Actual supply shock creates a persistent
oil scarcity in the economy. Although inflation is again stabilized by the monetary
authority, output goes down by 5%. The existence of storage and financial markets is
an obstacle for the monetary authority to control the output by lowering the nominal
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interest rate. In fact, lower interest rate will decrease the cost of storage and thus
encourage the storage operators to increase the level of inventory. This shrinks the
quantity of oil available in the spot market, already dampened by the actual supply
shortfall. More scarcity of oil induces higher real oil prices, less demand for oil and
labor (through marginal cost) and consequently a deeper recession.
2.8 Conclusion
This study examines the role of monetary policy in dampening or amplifying the
adverse eﬀects of oil price surges. There is a general consensus in the literature that
tight monetary policy associated with the oil price spikes of 1970-2000 exaggerated
inflation and output loss as a result of these spikes. In contrast with the literature,
which ignores storage and financial markets, we find that neither the interest-rate peg
abolishes the adverse eﬀects nor low-interest rate rules clearly lead to a higher welfare
compared to higher interest-rate rules. Instead, optimal monetary policy dictates
higher nominal interest rates as a response to an oil price shock, regardless of the
source, which smooths inflation but could lead to a 1-2% output loss. The source of
the shock plays an important role in determining the magnitude and variation of the
nominal interest rate. As a future work, it would be interesting to separate the eﬀect
of strategic investments from those incurred by precautionary demand motives, as a
significant part of inventories are supposedly not commercially driven. Besides, an
open economy extension of this model with three countries, international borrowing
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and free exchange rates can shed a light on the relationship between US exchange
rates and the price of oil.
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